Vishing and smishing: phone and text scams aimed at staff and customers
Voice phishing and SMS phishing use calls and texts to create urgency, often impersonating IT, banks, or delivery services, and increasingly with cloned voices. Common scripts, what to verify, and controls for help desks and customers.
What is vishing?
Vishing is phishing by voice. A caller pretends to be a bank, a vendor, or the help desk and asks for a code, a password, or a payment. Smishing is the same request by text message. People still trust a phone call more than email, which is why the channel works.
Who is affected by vishing?
The person on the phone, and every account or payment that person can approve. A help desk that resets a factor from one call also affects the account holder who was never on the line.
What do you change to defend against vishing?
Hang up and call the number printed on the card, the statement, or the badge. Do not read one-time codes to a caller. Help-desk scripts should refuse password and factor resets from a single unverified call.
Diagram
A combined text-and-call scam
Step 1 of 4
Text
A message claims a suspicious sign-in and asks the user to expect a call.
SMS: "Security alert: new sign-in to your account from another country. Our team will call you shortly to secure it."
The example on the open step is one illustration, or the fix you can paste into an application you own.
What this page is made of
3 pieces. Each one says what fails, who is affected, what you would notice, and what you change.
Caller ID spoofing
- What fails
- Displayed numbers can be faked.
- Who is affected
- Anyone who trusts caller ID.
- What you would notice
- Calls from “your bank” asking for codes.
- What you change
- Hang up and call the number on the card or website.
Code requests
- What fails
- No legitimate service needs your one-time code by phone.
- Who is affected
- Accounts protected by SMS or app codes.
- What you would notice
- Any request to read out a code.
- What you change
- Say it clearly in every alert and move users to passkeys.
Help-desk targets
- What fails
- Attackers call help desks pretending to be employees.
- Who is affected
- Accounts reset over the phone.
- What you would notice
- Urgent reset calls for executives.
- What you change
- Require identity proofing beyond knowledge questions.
Cloned voices
Short public recordings are enough to clone a voice. For high-value approvals, agree on a verification step that does not rely on recognizing a voice, such as a callback through the directory or a code word.
Check yourself
Recognition and the fix. Nothing here is a procedure.
A caller from “IT” asks for the code just sent to your phone. What do you do?
Go deeper
Specific techniques, exercises, and glossary cards for this topic.
- 01Phishing: reading a suspicious message and the controls that catch the restHow to examine a suspicious email by its headers, sender alignment, links, and attachments; the technical controls (DMARC, link rewriting, attachment sandboxing, phishing-resistant MFA) that limit damage; and how to run a reporting process. Includes the diagram and a defensive fix.
- 02Shoulder surfing: watching screens and keypads in public and at workShoulder surfing reads passwords, PINs, and data by watching screens or keypads, directly or by camera. Includes the diagram and a defensive fix.
- 03Tailgating and piggybacking: getting through a secured door behind someoneTailgating follows an authorized person through a door without their knowledge; piggybacking does it with their consent. Includes the diagram and a defensive fix.
Exercises
- 01Terminal mission: An HTML attachment that builds a ZIPExtract a base64 HTML attachment from a raw message, decode it, and see how it assembles a ZIP in the browser so the mail gateway never sees the archive.
- 02Terminal mission: Where the parcel notice really came fromRead a Received chain from the bottom up. Find the first hop, the desktop name and IP it was sent from, and the clue in Message-ID that a courier’s mail platform did not send it.
- 03Terminal mission: Unwrap a rewritten linkThe gateway rewrote every link through its click-checker. Decode the base64 parameter to see the real destination, without clicking, and count how many people received it.
Glossary
- 01SmishingA text message carries the lure.
- 02VishingThe same request arrives as a phone call, which people still trust more than email.
- 03PhishingA message imitates a trusted sender and persuades someone to hand over credentials or run a file.
- 04TailgatingSomeone follows an authorized person through a door.