Watering-hole attacks: compromising the sites a target group visits
Instead of contacting victims, attackers compromise a website or tool their targets trust, such as an industry forum, a vendor portal, or a developer resource. How these campaigns work, what defenders can see, and the browser and isolation controls that help.
Diagram
A trusted site turned against its visitors
Step 1 of 4
Profile
Attackers learn which sites a sector or company visits.
# Profile # Attackers learn which sites a sector or company visits.
The example on the open step is one illustration, or the fix you can paste into an application you own.
What this page is made of
3 pieces. Each one says what fails, who is affected, what you would notice, and what you change.
Trusted sites
- What fails
- Users and filters trust familiar industry sites.
- Who is affected
- The sector visiting them.
- What you would notice
- Script changes on vendor or community sites.
- What you change
- Treat category trust as weak and keep browsers patched.
Targeted serving
- What fails
- Payloads go only to chosen visitors, which makes discovery hard.
- Who is affected
- The targeted organization.
- What you would notice
- Reports from peers in your sector.
- What you change
- Share indicators through ISACs.
Third-party scripts
- What fails
- A compromised analytics or widget script reaches every site that loads it.
- Who is affected
- Visitors to all those sites.
- What you would notice
- Unpinned external scripts.
- What you change
- Use Subresource Integrity where scripts are static.
Subresource Integrity
SRI makes the browser refuse a script whose hash does not match.
<script src="https://cdn.example.net/widget-4.2.1.min.js"
integrity="sha384-oqVuAfXRKap7fdgcCY5uykM6+R9GqQ8K/uxy9rx7HNQlGYl1kPzQho1wx4JwY8wC"
crossorigin="anonymous"></script>Check yourself
Recognition and the fix. Nothing here is a procedure.
Why do watering-hole attacks often go unnoticed?
Sibling techniques
Pages at the same depth, plus a lab and a glossary card for this one.