Risk and resilienceHackBlue

STRIDE threat model board

Sort twelve threat cards for a clinic booking system into STRIDE categories, then map them to fixes and decide which one gets fixed first.

  • Interactive lab
  • Beginner
  • 5 graded steps
  • 0 of 5 solved

Your goal

Your goalSort twelve threats into the six STRIDE categories, match them to fixes, and choose which one to fix first.

A small clinic is launching online booking. The design review has a data flow diagram and twelve threats the team wrote on cards during a workshop.

Sort each card into the STRIDE category it belongs to. The board shows where each card landed, and a card turns red when the security property it breaks belongs to a different category.

What’s on screen
Data flow diagram
the top panel. It lists the parts of the booking system and the numbered flows between them.
Threat cards
the middle panel. Each card has six letter buttons, one per category.
Board
the bottom panel. It shows how many cards sit in each category, and turns a card red if it is in the wrong one.
Walkthrough
the numbered path beside the workbench (below it on a phone). Each step says what to do and what you should see. Hints open one at a time.
Words to know
STRIDE
a threat checklist: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege
API
application programming interface, how programs talk to a service
Data flow diagramevery flow below crosses a trust boundary
Patient browserInternet
Booking APIApp network
Appointments DBData network
Referral letter bucketCloud storage
Payment providerThird party
Staff admin consoleClinic network
  • 1
    Patient browser → Booking APIHTTPS: book, cancel, upload
  • 2
    Booking API → Appointments DBSQL
  • 3
    Booking API → Referral letter bucketObject storage API
  • 4
    Payment provider → Booking APIPayment webhook
  • 5
    Staff admin console → Booking APIAdmin API
Threat cards0 of 12 placed
  • —
    Someone signs in to the admin console as a receptionist with a password reused from another breach.Staff admin console
  • —
    The API accepts payment webhooks without checking the provider’s signature, so anyone can post “paid”.Booking API
  • —
    A patient edits the price field in the booking request before it reaches the API, and the API trusts it.Patient browser
  • —
    The search box is concatenated into SQL, letting a user rewrite other patients’ appointment rows.Appointments DB
  • —
    A doctor says they never cancelled 40 appointments, and the API records no actor for cancellations.Booking API
  • —
    Admins can edit the audit log that records their own actions.Staff admin console
  • —
    Changing the number in /appointments/1042 returns another patient’s booking.Booking API
  • —
    Referral letters are stored in a bucket that anyone with the URL can read.Referral letter bucket
  • —
    A script books every free slot for the next month, so real patients cannot book.Booking API
  • —
    Huge uploads fill the disk that the API also uses for its database connection logs, and the API stops.Booking API
  • —
    A receptionist account can call the admin endpoint that changes staff roles.Staff admin console
  • —
    The API container runs as root with the Docker socket mounted, so a code bug gives control of the host.Booking API
Board

S · Spoofing (0)

    Can someone pretend to be another user or system?

    T · Tampering (0)

      Can data or code be changed without permission?

      R · Repudiation (0)

        Can someone deny an action because nothing proves it?

        I · Information disclosure (0)

          Can data reach someone who should not see it?

          D · Denial of service (0)

            Can the service be made unavailable?

            E · Elevation of privilege (0)

              Can someone do more than their role allows?

              The whole walkthrough

              Every step in order: 276 words, about 2 min. It gives away every answer, so try the steps first.