STRIDE threat model board
Sort twelve threat cards for a clinic booking system into STRIDE categories, then map them to fixes and decide which one gets fixed first.
- Interactive lab
- Beginner
- 5 graded steps
- 0 of 5 solved
Your goal
Your goalSort twelve threats into the six STRIDE categories, match them to fixes, and choose which one to fix first.
A small clinic is launching online booking. The design review has a data flow diagram and twelve threats the team wrote on cards during a workshop.
Sort each card into the STRIDE category it belongs to. The board shows where each card landed, and a card turns red when the security property it breaks belongs to a different category.
What’s on screen
- Data flow diagram
- the top panel. It lists the parts of the booking system and the numbered flows between them.
- Threat cards
- the middle panel. Each card has six letter buttons, one per category.
- Board
- the bottom panel. It shows how many cards sit in each category, and turns a card red if it is in the wrong one.
- Walkthrough
- the numbered path beside the workbench (below it on a phone). Each step says what to do and what you should see. Hints open one at a time.
Words to know
- STRIDE
- a threat checklist: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege
- API
- application programming interface, how programs talk to a service
- 1Patient browser → Booking APIHTTPS: book, cancel, upload
- 2Booking API → Appointments DBSQL
- 3Booking API → Referral letter bucketObject storage API
- 4Payment provider → Booking APIPayment webhook
- 5Staff admin console → Booking APIAdmin API
- —Someone signs in to the admin console as a receptionist with a password reused from another breach.Staff admin console
- —The API accepts payment webhooks without checking the provider’s signature, so anyone can post “paid”.Booking API
- —A patient edits the price field in the booking request before it reaches the API, and the API trusts it.Patient browser
- —The search box is concatenated into SQL, letting a user rewrite other patients’ appointment rows.Appointments DB
- —A doctor says they never cancelled 40 appointments, and the API records no actor for cancellations.Booking API
- —Admins can edit the audit log that records their own actions.Staff admin console
- —Changing the number in /appointments/1042 returns another patient’s booking.Booking API
- —Referral letters are stored in a bucket that anyone with the URL can read.Referral letter bucket
- —A script books every free slot for the next month, so real patients cannot book.Booking API
- —Huge uploads fill the disk that the API also uses for its database connection logs, and the API stops.Booking API
- —A receptionist account can call the admin endpoint that changes staff roles.Staff admin console
- —The API container runs as root with the Docker socket mounted, so a code bug gives control of the host.Booking API
S · Spoofing (0)
Can someone pretend to be another user or system?
T · Tampering (0)
Can data or code be changed without permission?
R · Repudiation (0)
Can someone deny an action because nothing proves it?
I · Information disclosure (0)
Can data reach someone who should not see it?
D · Denial of service (0)
Can the service be made unavailable?
E · Elevation of privilege (0)
Can someone do more than their role allows?
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The whole walkthrough
Every step in order: 276 words, about 2 min. It gives away every answer, so try the steps first.