Man-in-the-middle attacks: where interception happens and what stops it
Interception can happen on the local link, in DNS, at a rogue Wi-Fi access point, or through a trusted proxy. A map of those positions, what each one can see, and the controls (TLS validation, HSTS, 802.1X, DNSSEC) that end each one.
Diagram
Positions an interceptor can take
Step 1 of 4
Local link
ARP or neighbor spoofing on the same VLAN.
# Local link # ARP or neighbor spoofing on the same VLAN.
Reads and changes traffic
Sees nothing or clicks past a warning
Hard
The example on the open step is one illustration, or the fix you can paste into an application you own.
What this page is made of
3 pieces. Each one says what fails, who is affected, what you would notice, and what you change.
TLS is the last line
- What fails
- With valid certificate checks, an interceptor cannot read or change HTTPS.
- Who is affected
- Users who click through warnings, and apps that skip validation.
- What you would notice
- Code with verify=False or custom trust managers that accept all certificates.
- What you change
- Fail closed on certificate errors and pin where appropriate in mobile apps.
Legacy name resolution
- What fails
- Windows falls back to LLMNR and NBT-NS, which anyone on the segment can answer.
- Who is affected
- Domain users on the same VLAN.
- What you would notice
- LLMNR traffic on UDP 5355 or NBT-NS on UDP 137.
- What you change
- Disable both through Group Policy.
Switch protections
- What fails
- Access switches can drop spoofed ARP and rogue DHCP.
- Who is affected
- Every host on the access layer.
- What you would notice
- No DHCP snooping or Dynamic ARP Inspection configured.
- What you change
- Enable them on user VLANs.
Seeing it in a lab
In an isolated lab with two VMs and a router VM, you can watch how a spoofed ARP reply changes the victim’s neighbor table, and how Dynamic ARP Inspection on a lab switch drops it. The ARP spoofing page covers the detection side in detail.
Interception you put there on purpose
Corporate TLS inspection proxies are interception by design. They need their own root certificate on managed devices, strong key protection, and exclusions for banking, health, and pinned applications.
Check yourself
Recognition and the fix. Nothing here is a procedure.
Which control makes interception of HTTPS fail even if the network is hostile?
Go deeper
Specific techniques, exercises, and glossary cards for this topic.