Man-in-the-middle attacks: where interception happens and what stops it

Interception can happen on the local link, in DNS, at a rogue Wi-Fi access point, or through a trusted proxy. A map of those positions, what each one can see, and the controls (TLS validation, HSTS, 802.1X, DNSSEC) that end each one.

Lesson 2 of 17 · 13 min read · practice only with authorization

Diagram

Positions an interceptor can take

Follow the path. One example at a time.

Step 1 of 4

Local link

ARP or neighbor spoofing on the same VLAN.

Illustration: Local link
# Local link
# ARP or neighbor spoofing on the same VLAN.
What changes the outcome
Interceptor

Reads and changes traffic

User

Sees nothing or clicks past a warning

Detection

Hard

The example on the open step is one illustration, or the fix you can paste into an application you own.

What this page is made of

3 pieces. Each one says what fails, who is affected, what you would notice, and what you change.

  1. TLS is the last line

    What fails
    With valid certificate checks, an interceptor cannot read or change HTTPS.
    Who is affected
    Users who click through warnings, and apps that skip validation.
    What you would notice
    Code with verify=False or custom trust managers that accept all certificates.
    What you change
    Fail closed on certificate errors and pin where appropriate in mobile apps.
  2. Legacy name resolution

    What fails
    Windows falls back to LLMNR and NBT-NS, which anyone on the segment can answer.
    Who is affected
    Domain users on the same VLAN.
    What you would notice
    LLMNR traffic on UDP 5355 or NBT-NS on UDP 137.
    What you change
    Disable both through Group Policy.
  3. Switch protections

    What fails
    Access switches can drop spoofed ARP and rogue DHCP.
    Who is affected
    Every host on the access layer.
    What you would notice
    No DHCP snooping or Dynamic ARP Inspection configured.
    What you change
    Enable them on user VLANs.

Seeing it in a lab

In an isolated lab with two VMs and a router VM, you can watch how a spoofed ARP reply changes the victim’s neighbor table, and how Dynamic ARP Inspection on a lab switch drops it. The ARP spoofing page covers the detection side in detail.

Interception you put there on purpose

Corporate TLS inspection proxies are interception by design. They need their own root certificate on managed devices, strong key protection, and exclusions for banking, health, and pinned applications.

Check yourself

Recognition and the fix. Nothing here is a procedure.

1 / 3

Which control makes interception of HTTPS fail even if the network is hostile?

Go deeper

Specific techniques, exercises, and glossary cards for this topic.

  1. 01Real-time phishing of a sessionA one-time code can be relayed as the person types it. Includes the diagram and a defensive fix.

Exercises

  1. 01Terminal mission: Oslo, then Lagos, 26 minutes laterRead an Entra ID sign-in export with jq. Find the sign-in from a country the user could not have reached, the app it opened, and why MFA did not stop it.

Glossary

  1. 01PhishingA message imitates a trusted sender and persuades someone to hand over credentials or run a file.